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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the effect of shareholder passiveness on the market for corporate control. 
We find that firms with more passive shareholders (lower ownership per non-institutional 
shareholder) are less likely to be takeover targets, less likely to be acquired and command higher 
premiums. Using the adoption of anti-takeover law in Delaware as an exogenous shock to anti-
takeover protection, we show that the passiveness of shareholder base decreases as the takeover 
threat subsides. Our findings support the idea that a passive shareholder base is a substitute for 
other takeover defenses. 
 
 
JEL Codes: G34, G32 
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance.  
 
                                                 
†
 Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame. 
‡ 
University of Zürich, Swiss Finance Institute.  
We thank Mike Burkart, Alex Edmans, Stuart Gillan, John McConnell, Paul Schultz, and seminar participants at the 
State of Indiana Conference for their helpful comments. Östberg acknowledges financial support from NCCR 
Finrisk. Please address all correspondence to abodnaru@nd.edu. 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1730265
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In August of 2005, when Carl Icahn proposed to split up Time Warner into four parts, 
the New York Times commented “[Time Warner’s] large shareholder base would make it 
extremely difficult for him to gain enough influence to force change,” illustrating how large 
an impediment a widely dispersed shareholder base is to the market for corporate control.  
There are two related justifications for why a widely dispersed shareholder base may 
influence control contests. First, as the number of shareholders grows, the influence of each 
shareholder on the outcome of a control contest falls and shareholders are more likely to free-
ride (Grossman and Hart, 1980). Second, as the shareholder base of the firm becomes more 
dispersed, the dollar value of each shareholder's stake falls. If there are fixed costs associated 
with being active, then more shareholders will be inactive in a widely held firm.
1, 2
   
Grossman and Hart (1980) show that when shareholders are atomistic a takeover bid 
can only succeed if the bid price is equal to the post-takeover share value (otherwise 
shareholders are better off not tendering).
3
 When the number of shareholders is finite, bids 
that are below the post-takeover share value may still be successful (Bagnoli and Lipman, 
1988 and Holmström and Nalebuff, 1992). Essentially, when ownership by investors is no 
longer infinitesimal there is a probability that target shareholders perceive their tendering 
decision to be pivotal to the success of the tender offer and they thereby internalize part of 
the cost of them not tendering. As the ownership by each shareholder increases the likelihood 
that each shareholder is pivotal increases and the free-rider problem becomes less severe.  
                                                 
1
 Decision making is inherently costly and in the case of a tender offer shareholders have to evaluate the 
bidder's offer. Additionally, tendering shares involves an opportunity cost of time.  
2
 The difference between the two justifications is that free-riding involves the active choice of not tendering; the 
alternative is that shareholders are inactive because of attention costs or the cost of acquiring information. 
3
 In the atomistic shareholder setting, in the absence of a toehold (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) or the possibility 
to dilute non-tendering shareholders ex-post (Grossman and Hart, 1980b), the profit of the takeover will not 
cover the bidder's cost of launching the bid and the takeover will not take place. 
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The finite shareholder models generate several empirical predictions with respect to 
the degree of free-riding. Firstly, the larger the free-rider problem, the larger is the bid 
premium. The intuition for this is that as the free-rider problem is aggravated the bidder has 
to offer a higher price to make the pivotal shareholder indifferent between tendering and 
abstaining. Secondly, since bidder returns in a takeover are decreasing in the degree of free-
riding, the more passive the shareholder base is the less likely it is that the firm receives a bid. 
These two predictions are also consistent with shareholders being inactive. First, the 
lower the dollar value of the shareholders' stake, the higher the bid premium must be to 
induce shareholders to be active. Second, a higher bid premium lowers profits to the bidder 
and therefore reduces the likelihood that a takeover will take place. 
This paper investigates the impact of shareholder passiveness (due either to free-
riding or to inaction) on the market for corporate control. We measure the passiveness of the 
firm’s shareholders as the fraction of shares outstanding owned by the average non-
institutional shareholder. We find that companies with more passive shareholders (lower 
average ownership per shareholder) are less likely to be takeover targets. A one standard 
deviation increase in passiveness results in a 0.37% decrease in the likelihood of observing a 
bid (or 8.89% relative to the unconditional mean).
4
 For firms that are in play, increasing the 
passiveness by one standard deviation decreases the likelihood of completion by 5.79% 
(which corresponds to a 16.14% increase in non-completion risk) and increases the takeover 
premium by 2.23% (or 18.01% relative to the mean). These findings suggest that a passive 
                                                 
4
 Among others, Hasbrouck (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988, 1989), Mikkelson and Partch (1989), 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Song and Walkling (1993), Shivdasani (1993), and Comment and Schwert 
(1995) consider the characteristics of target firms. 
3 
 
shareholder base is an impediment to changes of corporate control and hence acts as a 
takeover defense.
5
 
The demonstrated relation between passiveness and the market for corporate control 
implies that the possibility of affecting passiveness is valuable to managers. There are a 
number of tools available to managers to alter the passiveness of the shareholder base. We 
show that shareholder passiveness can be significantly increased by undertaking a stock split 
or seasoned equity offering, while repurchases and reverse splits reduce passiveness.
6
 Thus, 
the firm’s managers can use corporate decisions to influence the firm’s passiveness and 
affect the likelihood and outcome of a takeover. 
To investigate whether a passive shareholder base is a substitute for other takeover 
defenses, we consider the introduction of anti-takeover legislation in Delaware in the 1990s 
as a natural experiment. This legislation validated the use of poison pills in conjunction with 
staggered boards, thereby increasing the difficulty of a successful takeover (Subramanian, 
2004). We utilize a differences-in-differences approach that accounts for the endogenous 
nature of firms’ choices for the passiveness of the shareholder base and corporate governance. 
Consistent with a passive shareholder base as acting as a substitute for other takeover 
defenses, we find that the ratification of the use of poison pills in conjunction with staggered 
boards leads to a reduction in the passiveness of the shareholder base by 10.5%. Furthermore, 
this reduction is more pronounced in firms that had a smaller number of other anti-takeover 
provisions. 
                                                 
5
 There is evidence that other takeover defenses, like poison pills, result in higher takeover premiums (Comment 
and Schwert, 1995, Heron and Lie, 2006) and reduce the likelihood that a takeover will take place (Field and 
Karpoff, 2002). Our results are consistent with their findings on the impact of anti-takeover measures on the 
M&A characteristics. 
6
 Our results corroborate earlier findings of Mukherji, Kim, and Walker (1997) for stock splits and Bodnaruk 
and Östberg (2011) for repurchases.  
4 
 
The prior literature has examined the relation between ownership structure and the 
market for corporate control by considering block, insider, or institutional ownership (e.g., 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988, McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Black, 1990). The 
presence of a blockholder may influence the degree of free-riding and passiveness. First, a 
large blockholder is likely to perceive his tendering decision to be pivotal and if his stake is 
sufficiently large then the free-rider problem is overcome. Additionally, a large blockholding 
by an investor may preclude the shareholder base from being passive.
7
  
We demonstrate that passiveness is distinct from block ownership.
8
 Firstly, even 
though block ownership and passiveness are negatively related, the correlation between these 
two measures is a modest -0.17. Secondly, we show that there is a lot of variability in 
shareholder passiveness controlling for block ownership. For example, 44.80% of firms with 
above median block ownership also have above median passiveness. Thirdly, we find that in 
39.88% of all companies block ownership is below 25%, indicating that in a large number of 
companies shareholder passiveness is still likely to be an issue.
9
 However, as expected, our 
regression results indicate that passiveness affects the market for corporate control most 
when block ownership is relatively low (below 25%).  
An advantage with our measure, the fraction of outstanding shares per shareholder, 
over variables like block ownership is that it has a clear relation to managerial entrenchment. 
When the stake per shareholder falls, shareholders are more passive and status quo is more 
likely to be preserved, and therefore managers are more entrenched. However, the relation 
                                                 
7
 Ferguson (1994) argues that in a setting in which there is competition among bidders, blockholdings by 
investors may not preclude free-riding. The reason is that the cost of not tendering is lower since competition 
implies that there will be future possibilities to tender.  
8
 We also show that passiveness is distinct from insider ownership, institutional ownership, and corporate 
governance, but in the interest of brevity this analysis can be found in Appendix 2. 
9
 In fact, 15.70% of our sample firms do not have block, insider, or institutional ownership above 25%. 
5 
 
between managerial entrenchment and block ownership is less clear since the block owner 
may or may not be aligned with management. In fact, Holderness (2009) shows that about 40% 
of block owners in U.S. firms do not have board representation.
10
 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we contribute to the literature on 
ownership structure by introducing a theoretically motivated measure of the degree of 
passiveness and verifying that this measure exhibits significant variation that is not captured 
by existing ownership measures. Second, once we have established the validity of our 
measure, we show that the degree of passiveness is a significant factor in the market for 
corporate control and a passive shareholder base is a substitute for other takeover defenses. 
Third, in a recent paper, Baker, Coval, and Stein (2007) argue that inertial behavior of target 
shareholders improves the terms for the acquiring firms in stock-for-stock mergers. Even 
though we share the conclusion that investor inertia / passiveness influences corporate 
policies we focus on different aspects of the market for corporate control. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our 
data and our measure of passiveness. Section 4 investigates the role of passiveness in 
takeover contests. Section 5 shows how firm managers can affect passiveness through 
corporate events. Section 6 shows how firm passiveness responds to changes in takeover 
regulation. Section 7 considers various robustness issues. Section 8 concludes. 
 
  
                                                 
10
Another potential measure of the free-rider problem is insider ownership. Even though managerial 
entrenchment is increasing in insider ownership, the agency problem vis-à-vis minority shareholders is also 
affected when insider ownership increases as a larger insider stake aligns the manager with minority interests 
(see Morck, Shleifer, and Visny, 1988). So any cross-sectional relation between insider ownership and the 
market for corporate control could either be due to differences in the free-rider problem or due to differences in 
the agency problem between insiders and minority shareholders. 
6 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
By relaxing the assumption of Grossman and Hart (1980) that there is a continuum of 
investors, Bagnoli and Lipman (1988), Holmstöm and Nalebuff (1992), and Ferguson (1994) 
allow for comparative statics with respect to the degree of the free-rider problem. When the 
ownership per investor decreases, the likelihood that an investor becomes pivotal falls and 
the free-rider problem is aggravated. As a consequence, the bid price increases in the 
takeover and the raider’s surplus decreases. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that have more passive shareholders receive higher bid prices. 
An increase in passiveness leads to a lower surplus to the raider since shareholders 
view their tendering as less pivotal. As a result, they internalize less of the effect of their 
tendering decision on the outcome of the takeover. Additionally, if there is a cost associated 
with launching a takeover bid, then all other things being equal we should observe fewer bids 
for firms with more passive shareholders, since the surplus of the raider has to compensate 
for the cost of undertaking the bid. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with more passive shareholders are less likely to receive takeover 
bids. 
The increase in shareholder inactivity when the average ownership per shareholder 
falls also justifies hypotheses 1 and 2.
11
 In fact, these predictions can be justified by any 
model that generates an upward sloping supply curve of shares (e.g. Stulz 1988, Burkart, 
                                                 
11
 Separating the free-rider problem from shareholder inactivity is challenging, since the two are observationally 
equivalent along the dimensions considered in this paper. 
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Gromb, and Pannunzi, 1998), as long as a more passive shareholder base implies that fewer 
shares are tendered.  
Field and Karpoff (2002) document that the presence of a poison pill reduces the 
likelihood that a takeover will be completed. If a passive shareholder base is a takeover 
defense, then we would expect a lower likelihood of completion when the shareholder base is 
passive.  
Hypothesis 3: In a takeover contest, a more passive shareholder base implies a lower 
likelihood of deal completion. 
Stulz (1988) argues that there is an optimal level of takeover protection. A too low 
level of takeover protection results in an inefficiently low (from the shareholder's perspective) 
bid price in a takeover, while a too high level of protection results in an inefficiently low 
likelihood of receiving a takeover bid. 
If so, the implementation of more stringent anti-takeover legislation should result in 
firms reducing other forms of takeover protection. The takeover protection of all firms 
incorporated in Delaware was unexpectedly increased in 1995 when the use of poison pills in 
conjunction with staggered boards was allowed. Firms should respond to this legislation by 
reducing other forms of takeover protection in order to return to the optimal level. In effect, 
after the increase in takeover protection, the management has fewer incentives to pursue 
costly activities, such as advertising (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, 2004), that have been 
shown to increase the retail shareholder base. Additionally, we document that managers can 
reduce passiveness through undertaking a reverse stock split or a share repurchase. This gives 
our final hypothesis: 
8 
 
Hypothesis 4: The passiveness of the shareholder base falls following an increase in 
anti-takeover regulation.  
We now proceed to describe our data. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
In this section, we define and provide descriptive statistics on our measure of 
passiveness. We then relate passiveness to other measures of the free-rider problem and 
corporate governance. 
 
3.1. Measuring passiveness 
There is an extensive literature that documents that institutional investors are active 
monitors (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2007). Additionally, Baker et al. (2007) show that 
institutional investor exhibit little inertia relative to retail investors. We, therefore, exclude 
institutional ownership from our measure of passiveness. We define Passiveness as 
 
                 
    
                                           
      
 
where IO (institutional ownership) is the fraction of outstanding shares owned by institutions, 
common shareholders is the number of common shareholders of record, and institutional 
investors is the number of institutional investors.
12,13
 We use the logarithm to control for 
                                                 
12
 Both the number of common shareholders and the number of institutional investors are measured in 
thousands. 
13
 Strictly speaking, we measure the characteristics of the average rather than the marginal shareholder. So an 
implicit assumption of our empirical analysis is that the average shareholder is a reasonable proxy for the 
marginal shareholder. 
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skewness and multiply the expression by (-1) to ensure that our measure is increasing in 
passiveness. We use Compustat item 100, “number of common shareholders of record,” to 
measure the number of common shareholders; institutional ownership is from Spectrum 
13f.
14
 Since the number of common shareholders of record is available on a yearly frequency, 
our measure of passiveness is measured at the end of the year and is valid for the next year. 
We calculate the “derived equity stake” of non-institutional shareholders of record as 
the ratio of fraction of shares outstanding owned by non-institutional shareholders divided by 
the number of non-institutional shareholders. We then calculate its dollar value by 
multiplying it by the company market capitalization at the end of year.  
 
                               
                             
                                           
     
 
The mean (median) derived equity stake (Table 1) is 0.025 (0.017) of a percentage point. The 
average (median) dollar value of the derived equity stake is 138,140 (31,360) US dollars. 
These numbers are large because Compustat item 100 understates the number of shareholders. 
We evaluate the impact of this in Section 3.2. As expected, the average retail ownership is 
significantly lower than that of institutional owners. The average (median) institutional 
investor holds 0.898 (0.576) of a percentage point of outstanding equity. The mean (median) 
dollar value of an institutional position is 4.70 (1.91) mln. 
Our measure of passiveness does not exclude block ownership or insider ownership, 
which we derive from Compact Disclosure, since they are not mutually exclusive from 
institutional ownership (Holderness, 2009). For example, if an insider owns a stake that is 
                                                 
14
 The average passiveness of Time Warner (mentioned in the introductory paragraph) over our sample period 
was 5.30, which corresponds to an average stake of non-institutional investors of 4.99×10
-4
 of a percent. That 
puts the passiveness of Time Warner among the top 5% of firms.  
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larger than 5%, then that stake will be included in both insider ownership and block 
ownership in Compact Disclosure. This implies that block ownership, insider ownership, and 
institutional ownership together often exceed the total amount of shares outstanding. In fact 
this is true for 40.67% of firms in our sample. In our analysis we separately consider 
situations when block or insider or institutional ownership is above or below 25%. 
Additionally, we use block, institutional, and insider ownership as control variables.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on passiveness and inside, block, and 
institutional ownership. The average (median) passiveness is 0.96 (0.77). There is also 
considerable variability in passiveness across firms in our sample; the standard deviation is 
1.93. The average (median) block ownership is 36.66% (33.18%) of shares outstanding. This 
number is consistent with Holderness (2009), who reports that in his random sample of 10% 
of the firms available in Compact Disclosure, block ownership is on average 39%. At the 
same time, block ownership is below 25% in 39.88% of all companies, which suggests that 
passiveness may be a consideration in a takeover contest for a large number of firms. 
 
3.2 Passiveness and holdings through brokerage accounts 
In the previous section, we found that the median investor stake in a firm is 31,360 
US dollars (according to the derived equity stake). This number seems large; an important 
reason why we overestimate the value of investor stakes is that all shareholders that hold 
stock through a financial intermediary are counted as one shareholder. This implies that the 
denominators in equation (1) and (2) are underestimated. However, there is no reason to 
suspect that the underestimation affects certain stocks or groups of stocks in a different way. 
11 
 
Nonetheless, to examine the effect of the understatement in the number of 
shareholders on passiveness we calculate Passiveness and the Dollar Value of Derived Equity 
Stake using individual investor level data from Sweden. Since the Swedish data possesses 
detailed information about investor stockholdings irrespective of whether the stock is held 
directly or through an intermediary, it allows us to compare passiveness calculated only 
through direct holdings (as in the U.S.) to passiveness calculated through the actual investor 
positions. 
The data comes from Värdepapperscentralen (VPC), which records stock ownership 
at the investor level (each investor is identified by an anonymized equivalent to the social 
security number). The dataset also has information on investor type and whether the position 
is held directly or through a financial intermediary.
15
  
Table 2 presents the results from the Swedish data. We consider all stocks traded on 
the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 2000.
16
 In Sweden, in the average firm 38.9% of investors 
own the stock directly and 61.1% of investors hold the stock through an intermediary.  
We compare the dollar value of the actual positions of all non-institutional investors 
(direct holdings and holdings through an intermediary) to the dollar value of positions that 
are held directly. The mean (median) dollar value of the actual position of all investors is 
24,245 (444) US dollars while the mean (median) dollar value of actual directly held 
positions is 28,650 (400) US dollars. These numbers suggest that directly held stakes are very 
similar to the stakes held through intermediaries. The magnitude of these numbers is also 
comparable to those found by Barber and Odean (2000), who consider data from a U.S. 
brokerage firm. 
                                                 
15
 For a closer description of the dataset, see Gianetti and Simonov (2006) or Massa and Simonov (2006). 
16
 All of the values reported in Table 2 are in US dollars. 
12 
 
We then calculate the Dollar Value of Derived Equity Stake (equation 2) using 
directly held positions for the Swedish sample; the mean (median) is 181,316 (33,879) US 
dollars. So, only considering investors that hold the stock directly implies that the calculated 
dollar value of stakes in Sweden is similar to those calculated for the U.S. (mean 138,140, 
median 31,360 US dollars). 
Finally, to examine the impact of having only direct holdings on the measurement of 
passiveness, we calculate two measures of passiveness (Equation (1)) for Sweden, using the 
actual position values of investors (Actual Passiveness) and derived equity stakes of direct 
stock owners (Passiveness). As expected, the latter is significantly smaller; however, the 
correlation between these two variables is in excess of 95%. Additionally, the Adj. R
2
 of the 
regression of Actual Passiveness on Passiveness is 86.5%. All of the above suggests that the 
measure of passiveness estimated from derived equity stakes of non-institutional investors is 
a good proxy for passiveness. 
  
3.3 Passiveness, other measures of ownership, and corporate governance 
We now proceed to relate passiveness to other measures of the free-rider problem and 
corporate governance. The correlation between block ownership and passiveness is -0.17. 
The negative relation is to be expected, since large block holdings raise the average 
ownership per shareholder. However, there is a significant amount of variation in passiveness 
that is not due to variation in block ownership. To demonstrate this, we sort companies into 
two groups by block ownership and separately sort them into two groups by passiveness. We 
then calculate the frequencies of firms falling in corresponding block ownership / passiveness 
groups. If block ownership fully determines passiveness, then all firms that have high block 
13 
 
ownership will also have low passiveness and vice versa (i.e., no firms will have high block 
ownership and high passiveness). Independence between block ownership and passiveness 
implies that each of the four block ownership and passiveness groups should contain 25% of 
all firms.  
We find that the distribution of firms across block ownership / passiveness groups is 
very even: 22.40% of our sample firms have higher than median block ownership and higher 
than median passiveness. That implies that 27.60% of our sample firms have high block 
ownership and low passiveness.  
To further corroborate the hypothesis that passiveness and block ownership are 
distinct, we find that companies with similar block ownership are often on opposite ends of 
the distribution in terms of passiveness. For example, Allos Therapeutics (cusip 019777) and 
Ariad Pharmaceuticals (cusip 04033A) are both pharmaceutical companies (SIC2=28) that as 
of the end of 2006 had a similar market capitalization (331 mln vs. 336 mln) and block 
ownership (21.90% vs 22.79%). Allos’s passiveness was -3.40, which places the company in 
the bottom 25% of passiveness, whereas Ariad’s passiveness is 4.42, which puts the company 
among the top 25% in terms of passiveness. 
In a similar way we relate passiveness to insider ownership, institutional ownership, 
and corporate governance as measured by the G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003).
17
 The results are qualitatively similar to those of passiveness and block ownership. In 
the interest of brevity we report the results in Appendix 2. 
To provide additional evidence that shareholder passiveness is a distinct company 
characteristic, we run a set of regressions with passiveness as the dependent variable and 
                                                 
17
 An insider that owns more than 5% of outstanding voting stock is also classified as a blockholder and 
therefore to some extent controlled for when we consider block ownership.  
14 
 
block ownership, insider ownership, institutional ownership, corporate governance, and 
company size as explanatory variables. Even though all of the above variables turn out to be 
statistically significant in the regression their explanatory power – individually and combined 
– appears to be rather low. Block ownership alone explains explain 3.15% of passiveness, 
insider ownership explains 7.08%, institutional ownership explains 19.14%, G-index 
explains 5.09%, and size explains 32.45%. Inclusion of all five of them in the regression 
results in an R
2
 of 36.19%.  
To summarize, while passiveness is related to the previously used measures of free-
riding and company corporate governance defenses, there is a lot of variation in passiveness 
that is not explained either by any of these variables single-handedly or by all of them 
combined. Thus, the evidence presented here suggests that passiveness is a distinct company 
characteristic.
18
 
 Additionally, in our analysis we control for the following company characteristics: 
book-to-market, age, total payout, price-to-earnings, debt-to-equity, operating income, past 
year return, stock volatility, stock liquidity, industry affiliation, and industry concentration. A 
detailed description of the variables is provided in Appendix 1. All accounting and 
performance variables are derived from the CRSP-Compustat Merged database (CCM). 
Descriptive statistics of the control variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
4. Shareholder passiveness and the market for corporate control 
                                                 
18
 We have also considered the relation between passiveness and industry. In general, industries in which firms 
have other firms as customers, like chemical services or leather production, are characterized by low 
passiveness. Industries in which firms have individuals as customers, like retail firms and communications, are 
the most passive. The results can be found in Table R2. 
15 
 
We start by relating passiveness of the shareholder base to the characteristics of 
mergers and acquisitions. Our source of data on merger activity is the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) M&A database, from which we extract all merger transactions involving 
U.S. targets over the period of 1981-2007. To be included in the sample, we require the target 
firm to be listed and to report the number of common shareholders of record; additionally, it 
must be possible to match the target’s CUSIP with CRSP. The resulting sample comprises 
4,642 M&A announcements. We complement this data with the data on block and insider 
ownership, which we derive from Compact Disclosure. Since it only covers the period from 
1991 to 2006, this reduces number of observations in some of our tests.  
We first investigate the relation between passiveness and the likelihood of receiving a 
takeover bid. We estimate a probit regression where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 
if a company receives a takeover bid in the following year, 0 otherwise. The results are 
reported in Table 3. We find that shareholder passiveness is negatively and statistically 
significantly related to the likelihood of observing a bid. In our baseline specification (1), a 
one standard deviation increase in passiveness leads to a reduction of bid likelihood by 0.42% 
(or 10.12% relative to the sample mean). 
Specification (2) introduces insider ownership and block ownership as controls. 
Accounting for these measures of ownership does not have a material effect on the impact of 
passiveness on the likelihood of receiving a bid. Now a one standard deviation increase in 
passiveness is associated with a 0.33% decrease in the likelihood of receiving a bid (or 10.28% 
relative to the sample mean). To put these numbers into perspective, a one standard deviation 
increase in institutional ownership increases the likelihood of receiving a bid by 0.62%; for 
block ownership and insider ownership the corresponding increases are 0.04% and 0.09%. 
16 
 
To examine whether the effect of passiveness varies depending on the ownership 
structure of the firm, we introduce three dummy variables. The variables HighIO, HighBlock 
and HighInside take a value of 1 if institutional, block, or insider ownership are greater than 
50%, 25%, or 10%, respectively. In specification (3), we interact passiveness with HighIO 
and its complement. As expected, we find that the impact of passiveness is larger when 
institutional ownership is low. A one standard deviation increase in passiveness reduces the 
likelihood of receiving a bid by 0.45% (or 13.88% relative to the mean) for firms with 
institutional ownership below 50%, while for high institutional ownership firms it is not 
statistically significant. 
In specification (4) we interact passiveness with HighBlock. Similar to the 
institutional ownership case, we find that for firms without significant block ownership the 
effect of passiveness is stronger. To further illustrate the point, specification (5) considers 
those firms for which we expect the effect of passiveness to be the greatest. We interact 
passiveness with a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if HighIO, HighBlock, or 
HighInside equals 1. This means that those firms that do not belong to this group have 
institutional ownership below 50%, block ownership below 25%, and insider ownership 
below 10%. In our sample, 17.57% of firms satisfy these criteria. For these firms the effect of 
passiveness is substantially greater; a one standard deviation increase in passiveness leads to 
a decrease in the likelihood of receiving a bid of 0.82%, compared to 0.22% for firms with 
concentrated ownership. 
We proceed to investigate the relation between passiveness and the likelihood of deal 
completion. We estimate a probit regression where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 
if the bid is ultimately successful, 0 otherwise. The results, reported in Table 4, show that 
17 
 
firms with a passive shareholder base are less likely to be taken over upon receiving a bid. In 
our baseline specification, (1), the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in 
passiveness is a 5.71% reduction in the likelihood of completion of the deal, which 
corresponds to 16.15% increase in non-completion risk. Controlling for insider and block 
ownership (specification (2)) reduces the marginal impact of passiveness to 4.45%. However, 
this is still large compared to the marginal impact of institutional ownership (2.77%), block 
ownership (2.05%), and insider ownership (1.83%). 
We then interact passiveness with our dummy variables HighIO, HighBlock, and 
HighInside. In specifications (3) to (5), we find weak evidence that the impact of passiveness 
is larger in the absence of concentrated ownership. In specification (6), we analyze the 
impact of the presence of a poison pill on deal completion. To do this we introduce a dummy 
variable, poison pill that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a poison pill and 0 otherwise. We 
interact the presence of a poison pill with passiveness and find that in the absence of a poison 
pill passiveness is negatively and statistically significantly related to deal completion, while 
the presence of a poison pill renders passiveness insignificant.  
Finally, we turn our attention to the effect of shareholder passiveness on the takeover 
premium (Table 5). Our dependent variable is the four-factor adjusted return on the target’s 
stock from 3 months before the bid announcement to 2 months after the deal announcement 
or resolution date, (i.e. (–63; min (+42, resolution date)) event window) (Schwert, 2000). We 
find that companies with more passive shareholders command higher premiums in takeovers. 
In specification (1), a one standard deviation increase in passiveness results in a 2.23% 
higher premium, which corresponds to an 18.1% increase relative to the mean. The result is 
consistent with Comment and Schwert (1995), who argue that takeover defenses shift 
18 
 
bargaining power toward the target firm, which leads to a higher premium for the target 
shareholders. The magnitude of the relationship goes up to 4.48% after accounting for insider 
and block ownership (specification (2)). The economic impact of shareholder passiveness on 
the M&A premium is comparable to the impact of institutional ownership (5.82%), insider 
ownership (3.65%), and block ownership (7.12%). 
In specifications (3) to (5), we consider the effect of concentrated ownership on the 
relation between passiveness and the takeover premium. For firms with highly concentrated 
ownership, the relation between passiveness and the takeover premium is marginal at best. 
However, for firms that do not have concentrated ownership, the positive relation between 
passiveness and the takeover premium is statistically and economically strong. For example, 
for firms with low block ownership (specification (4)), a one standard deviation increase in 
passiveness results in an 8.15% increase in the takeover premium. In specification (6), by 
interacting our dummy variable for the presence of a poison pill with the passiveness of the 
shareholder base, we can deduce whether the effect of a passive shareholder base is altered 
by a poison pill. For firms that have a poison pill the relation between passiveness and the 
takeover premium is insignificant, while the relation is almost unaltered for those firms that 
do not have poison pill. This indicates that a passive shareholder base is a substitute for a 
poison pill: when a poison pill is present the marginal effect of a passive shareholder base is 
minimal. 
As an example of the importance of high shareholder passiveness for the outcome of 
a takeover contest, consider the hostile bid by Kollmorgen for Pacific Scientific in December 
1997. Surrounding the announcement Pacific Scientific experienced a stock price increase of 
67.91%. Nonetheless, the shareholder base of Pacific Scientific was so diffuse that it 
19 
 
managed to fend off the hostile bid. In fact, the passiveness of Pacific Scientific at the time of 
the bid was 2.51, which put it in the upper quartile in terms of passiveness.
19
  
 
5. Managing passiveness 
In the previous section we demonstrated that companies with higher shareholder 
passiveness are better able to fight off takeovers. Since passive shareholders are unlikely to 
tender their shares in M&As, their votes are effectively controlled by the management in the 
spirit of Stulz (1988). The ability to affect passiveness should, therefore, be valuable to the 
management. 
We now proceed to investigate the tools that managers have at their disposal to alter 
the degree of shareholder passiveness. Our non-exhaustive list of corporate decisions that 
might affect the number of non-institutional investors includes stock splits, reverse stock 
splits, seasoned equity offerings, and share repurchases.
20
 The data on splits, reverse splits, 
and SEOs comes from SDC. We derive information on share repurchases from CRSP-
Compustat Merged database.  
To investigate the effect of corporate events on the shareholder passiveness, we 
estimate the following pooled panel regression, 
 
                                                                      
                                           
            
 
                                                 
19
 It was later acquired by Danaher. 
20
 One notable corporate decision that has been documented to increase the number of shareholders is 
advertising expenditure (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, 2004). We exclude advertising expenditure since it 
would result in a tenfold decrease in sample size. 
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where ∆Passi(t,t+1) is the difference in passiveness between year t and t+1 of firm i. In 
specifications (1) and (3), Split (Reverse Split, Rep, and SEO) is a dummy which equals 1 if 
a company undertook a stock split (reverse split, repurchase, or SEO) in year t and 0 
otherwise. However, in specifications (2) and (4) we consider the size of the corporate 
decision (i.e., Spliti,t refers to how large a split firm i did in year t). In all of our specifications, 
X is a set of company characteristics augmented by time and industry fixed effects. All of our 
explanatory variables are measured in year t and defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are 
clustered at industry level. 
We present our regression results in Table 6. As expected, we find that undertaking a 
stock split or a seasoned equity offering results in an increase in passiveness. On the other 
hand, firms that undertake a reverse-split or a repurchase reduce shareholder passiveness. 
These findings mirror those of Mukherji, Kim, and Walker (1997) on stock splits and those 
of Bodnaruk and Östberg (2011) on repurchases. The results remain qualitatively unchanged 
if we consider the magnitude of corporate events instead of dummies and/or control for 
contemporaneous changes in other measures of ownership.  
In terms of economic magnitudes, in specification (3) a typical firm undertaking a 
stock split increases its shareholder passiveness by 0.06, which corresponds to 97.54% 
relative to the mean yearly change in passiveness for the entire sample of firms. Undertaking 
a reverse stock split on average reduces passiveness by -0.13 (or by 205.36% relative to the 
mean yearly change). Similarly, undertaking a repurchase reduces passiveness by -0.05 (or 
by 74.47% relative to sample mean). To summarize, management appear to have a range of 
effective tools at their disposal that could be utilized to affect the passiveness of shareholder 
base. 
21 
 
6. Exogenous shock to anti-takeover protection and passiveness of shareholder base 
6.1. Empirical strategy  
Our central tenet is that a passive shareholder base acts as a takeover defense and 
therefore is a substitute for other takeover defenses. To test this, we consider the change in 
Delaware’s takeover law that provided an increased level of takeover protection. Those firms 
affected by the regulatory change should respond by reducing other takeover defenses, so as 
to return to the optimal level of takeover protection.
21
 Hence, we expect firms incorporated in 
Delaware to reduce the size of their shareholder base in response to this legal change relative 
to non-Delaware firms. 
The challenge to investigating this statement in our context is unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and the endogenous nature of the passiveness of a firm’s shareholder base. To 
address this issue, we use differences-in-differences methodology.  
The basic regression model to estimate the differences-in-differences effect of this 
anti-takeover law is: 
 
                                                     
            
 
where           is an indicator variable that is 1 if a firm is incorporated in Delaware, 
              is an indicator variable that is 1 if an observation is after 1995,   is a set of 
company specific characteristics augmented by state, industry, and time fixed effects, and  is 
     an error term. 
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 Stulz (1988) argues that when choosing the optimal takeover protection, firms trade off the probability of 
receiving a takeover bid against the price of the bid. 
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This regression implements the differences-in-differences methodology for multiple 
comparison groups, where state fixed effects account for fixed differences between firms in 
the passing and non-passing states of the anti-takeover law, and time fixed effects control for 
aggregate fluctuations. Under this specification, the coefficient estimate on the interactive 
term                         measures the differences-in-differences effect of the anti-
takeover laws on the passiveness of shareholder base. We also control for a number of 
variables used in the previous section. Standard errors are clustered at the state and time level 
to account for the serial correlation concerns associated with a differences-in-differences 
estimation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). 
 
6.2 Regression results 
In Table 7 we report the results on the effect of changes in takeover law in Delaware 
on the passiveness of shareholder base. Specification (1) shows that the parameter estimate 
on the interaction between the post-1995 and the Delaware indicator variables is significantly 
negative. That is, firms in Delaware reduced the passiveness of their shareholder base by 
22.13% in response to Delaware’s change in takeover laws, after accounting for systematic 
differences between Delaware and non-Delaware firms, and economy-wide effects. This 
result is consistent with the optimizing behavior of an entrenched manager: once the threat of 
a takeover is reduced by legal change, the manager responds by reducing the level of 
takeover protection by allowing the shareholder base to become less passive. Accounting for 
insider and block ownership – specification (2) – reduces the magnitude of the abnormal drop 
in passiveness to 10.5%, which is still economically and statistically significant. 
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Specification (3) presents the results of a differences-in-differences-in-differences 
(DDD) specification by separating firms with and without poison pills. Our conjecture is that 
firms with existing takeover defenses will respond less to a legal change in takeover laws. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms without poison pills incorporated in 
Delaware decreased the passiveness of their shareholder base after 1995 by 21.34%, while 
the passiveness of the shareholder base for Delaware firms with poison pills remained 
unchanged after accounting for the state-specific (Delaware vs. non-Delaware firms), time-
specific (pre- and post-1995 years), and firm-level takeover defense (firms with and without 
poison pills) differences. 
In specification (4), we repeat the differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) 
estimation using governance index G-index instead of the poison pill indicator. Since firms 
with a large governance index measure managerial entrenchment with existing takeover 
defenses, we expect these firms to be less responsive to Delaware’s legal change. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, we find that the parameter estimate of the triple-interaction term 
(indicators of Delaware, post-1995, and G-index) is significantly positive. In other words, the 
passiveness of the shareholder base for Delaware incorporated firms decreased after 1995 
primarily for the firms with low levels of anti-takeover defenses, whereas there has been little 
change for companies with high values of G-index. 
 To sum up, these results support the view that corporate governance (the disciplinary 
threat of takeover) impacts firms’ choices concerning the passiveness of their shareholder 
base, and that the passiveness of the shareholder base is used as a takeover defense 
mechanism by entrenched managers. 
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7. Robustness 
We have shown that our measure of passiveness is related to the market for corporate 
control. In this section, we document that passive shareholders are also less active in other 
dimensions. First, we consider the retail trading volume of passive firms and find that passive 
firms have a lower retail trading volume. Second, we expect firms with passive shareholders 
to have lower values of Tobin’s Q, since their shareholders are more likely to free-ride in all 
governance issues, not only when it comes to tendering shares in control contests. 
 
7.1 Passiveness and retail trading 
We relate trading activity to the passiveness of the shareholder base in Table 8. We 
consider three measures aimed at capturing the trading activities of retail investors: the ratio 
of the number of retail trades to the number of total trades executed by all investors 
(Specifications (1) and (2)), the ratio of the number of shares traded by retail investors to the 
number of total shares traded by all investors (Specifications (3) and (4)), and the ratio of the 
dollar value of shares traded by retail investors to the total dollar value of shares traded by all 
investors (Specifications (5) and (6)). We classify retail investors’ trades as those trades with 
less than 500 shares, using the convention of small trades adopted in Security and Exchange 
Commission’s Rule 11Ac1-5 (i.e., Dash-5).22 Using the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database 
produced by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), we first compute these ratios stock by 
stock on a daily basis, and then average these ratios with appropriate horizons. The data 
covers the period 1992 to 2006. 
                                                 
22
 We recognize that this classification has its limitations. In a number of unreported robustness checks, we 
further classify “small retail trades” based on the alternative classification algorithm developed in Lee and 
Radhakrishna (2000) and recently adopted in Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), Barber, Odean, and Zhu 
(2009), and Hvidkjaer (2009), among others. The results are qualitatively similar.  
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We use the set of standard control variables used in Chordia, Huh, and 
Subrahmanyam (2007), including institutional ownership, size, book-to-market ratio, past 
one-year stock return, return volatility, stock liquidity, and industry fixed effects. We also 
control for year fixed effects in all of our regressions to take into account potential time-
series trends in our small trade measures.
23
  
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results on the relation between average daily retail 
trading activity and passiveness. The dependent variables are daily averages of our small 
trades measures computed over the subsequent year. Consistent with our conjecture, a more 
passive shareholder base is associated with less retail trading; the effect is also economically 
and statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in passiveness is associated 
with a decrease in retail trading activity of between 3.2% and 7.2% relative to the 
unconditional mean. 
Panel B focuses on the trading activity of retail investors during the earnings 
announcement period. We view the results reported in Panel B as a set of conditional results 
in which the conditioning variable is the news of the earnings announcement. To the extent 
that earnings announcements constitute important firm-initiated news, earnings 
announcements provide incentives for market participants – including retail investors – to 
trade (see Chordia et. al, 2007). Therefore, focusing on the earnings announcement period 
trading activities of retail investors provides us with additional ability to delineate the market 
participation of retail investors. The dependent variables in these regressions are the daily 
averages of our small trades measures computed over the 3-day event window starting on the 
                                                 
23
 For example, there is an increasing tendency for sophisticated institutional investors to break up trades into 
smaller pieces to attenuate price impact (i.e., the so-called “order slicing” practice) after 2002. In addition, to 
include fixed effects in our regressions, we have also verified that our results are robust if we restrict our sample 
to before 2002.  
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day of the earnings announcement and ending two days after. The results are in line with the 
unconditional tests reported in Panel A. A one standard deviation increase in passiveness is 
associated with a decrease in retail trading activity of between 2.6% and 7.7% relative to the 
unconditional mean. To summarize, shareholder passiveness appears to have a significant 
impact on the retail trading activity. 
 
7.2 Tobin’s Q of passive firms 
A passive shareholder base implies that the status quo is much more likely to be 
maintained and that the manager is effectively entrenched. To verify this, we relate 
passiveness to Tobin’s Q (Table 9). As expected, we find a negative and statistically 
significant relation between passiveness and Tobin’s Q. In terms of economic impact 
(Specification (2)), a one standard deviation increase in passiveness results in a reduction in 
Tobin’s Q of 0.10. In specifications (3) through (5), we consider the effect of concentrated 
ownership on the relation between passiveness and Tobin’s Q. As before, passiveness matters 
most in firms with less concentrated ownership. For firms with highly concentrated 
ownership, the relation between passiveness and Tobin’s Q is never statistically significant. 
 
Conclusions 
In June 2006, Kirk Kerkorian owned 9.9% of General Motors (GM) through his 
holding company Tracinda. Kerkorian and several other shareholders were vocal about their 
displeasure with GM's board and management. However, Business Week commented that 
“Unless he and his man-at-arms (and former GM director) Jerome York can win over GM's 
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historically passive shareholder base, … , it will be tough to gain control by arguing that 
Wagoner isn't doing anything right.”24 
This example illustrates that in practice a passive shareholder base may be a 
significant impediment to changes in control even in the presence of blockholders.
25
 In this 
paper, we examine the effect of passiveness on the market for corporate control. To do this 
we consider the passiveness of the shareholder base (low ownership per shareholder). We 
find that firms that have a passive shareholder base are less likely to receive takeover bids 
and are less likely to be taken over. And if they are taken over, firms with a more passive 
shareholder base command a higher premium. In terms of economic magnitude, a one 
standard deviation increase in the passiveness of the shareholder base decreases the 
likelihood of deal completion by 5.79%, which corresponds to a 16.14% increase in the non-
completion risk. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the passiveness of the 
shareholder base leads to a 2.23% increase in the takeover premium. 
In order to address the issue of endogeneity, we investigate the impact of an 
exogenous increase in anti-takeover legislation in Delaware in the mid-1990s as a natural 
experiment. When Delaware ratified the use of a staggered board in conjunction with a 
poison pill, the passiveness of firms incorporated in Delaware fell.  
Taken together our results indicate that shareholder passiveness affects the outcomes, 
of corporate control contests and is a substitute for other takeover defense mechanisms. 
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 “GM’s Wagoner gets ready to fight back,” Business Week, October 23, 2006 
25
 Even with significant block ownership General Motors was in the top 1% of firms in terms of passiveness. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Description of Variable and Source of Data 
Passiveness Passiveness of company non-institutional shareholder base, calculated as  
 
where institutional ownership is the fraction of outstanding shares owned by institutions, 
common shareholders is the number of common shareholders of record (in thousands), 
CCM data 100, and institutional investors is the number of institutional investors (in 
thousands), estimated from Spectrum 13f. 
Market Cap Year-end equity market capitalization: (price x shares outstanding), CCM data 24 x data 25 
25ta .25. Book-to-Market, B/M Ratio of long-term debt to the total equity of the firm: CCM data 9/ data 60. 
Price-to-Earnings, P/E Ratio of the year-end stock price to earnings per share for the prior fiscal year: CCM data 
24/data 58. 
Debt-to-Equity, D/E Ratio of long-term debt to the total equity of the firm: CCM data 9/ data 60. 
Operating Income Ratio of operating income to total assets: CCM data 13/ data 6. 
Growth of Sales Average annual increase in company sales over the previous 3 year period, obtained from 
CCM data item 12. 
Cash Ratio of cash holdings to total assets: CCM data 1/ data 6. 
Stock Liquidity  Sum of the monthly share volume over the previous year divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the year: CRSP Monthly Stocks. 
Past Year Return Compounded monthly return for the previous year: CRSP Monthly Stocks. 
Volatility Stock return volatility, computed as the standard deviation of daily stock returns for the 
previous year: CRSP Daily Stocks. 
Capital Expendit., 
Capex 
Ratio of capital expenditure to total assets of the firm: CCM data 128/ data 6. 
ROE Ratio of earnings to average equity for the prior fiscal year: CCM data 20/ (data 60 + data 
60(t-1))/2). 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Year-end fraction of shares outstanding owned by institutional fund managers: Spectrum 
13f. 
Industry Concentration  Sum of the squared market share of each firm in the same industry during a year. Market 
share is defined as the total sales of the firm in a given year divided by the total sales of the 
industry in the year. The industry is defined at the three-digit SIC code level; the SIC codes 
have been obtained from CRSP Monthly Stocks (SICCD). The sales data comes from 
CCM: data 12. 
Block ownership Fraction of shares outstanding pertaining to shareholders with at least 5% ownership stake. 
Estimated from Compact Disclosure. 
Insider ownership 
Fraction of shares outstanding pertaining to the company management. Estimated from 
Compact Disclosure. 
HighIO 
A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if Institutional Ownership is above 50%, 0 
otherwise. 
HighBlock 
A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if Block Ownership is above 25%, 0 
otherwise. 
HighInside 
A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if Inside Ownership is above 10%, 0 
otherwise. 
Corporate Governance 
Index, G 
Measured as in Gompers, Ishii, and Metric (2003): sum of the number of provisions 
restricting shareholder rights. Data obtained from IRRC. 
Poison Pill 
Poison pill dummy which takes a value of 1 if a company has a poison pill in place and 0 
otherwise. Data obtained from SDC. 
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Appendix 2: Passiveness and insider ownership, institutional ownership, and 
governance 
 
Passiveness and insider ownership 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) relate insider ownership to firm performance. 
Like block ownership, sufficiently large insider ownership will preclude a free-riding 
problem. In our sample the average (median) insider ownership is 17.70% (8.34%). This is 
lower than the 24% (17%) pre-adjusted insider ownership reported by Holderness (2009). 
The difference is likely because Holderness selects a random sample of approximately 10% 
of the firms available in Compact Disclosure. Even though insider ownership is prevalent, we 
find that in 53.09% (42.65%) of firms insider ownership is below 10% (5%). 
The correlation between insider ownership and passiveness is -0.28; firms with 
substantial managerial ownership tend to have a high average ownership per investor. As 
with block ownership, we sort companies into two groups by insider ownership and 
separately sort them in two groups by passiveness. Panel A of Table R1 presents the results; 
as expected given the correlation, there is a tendency for firms with large insider ownership 
also to have a less passive shareholder base. However, the relation is far from deterministic; 
30.90% of the firms have a high insider ownership and low passiveness while 19.10% of the 
firms have high insider ownership and high passiveness.
1
  
                                                 
1
 Even though firms may have similar insider ownership, the dispersion of the remaining stake may be very 
different. For example, at the end of 2006, Kforce, Inc (cusip 493732) and Vital Images (cusip 92846N), two 
business services industry (sic2=73) companies, had very similar inside ownership (6.37% vs. 3.48%) and 
similar market capitalization (498 mln vs. 588 mln). However, Kforce’s passiveness was -0.52, which places a 
company in the bottom 25% of passiveness, whereas Vital Images’s passiveness is 3.64, which corresponds to 
the upper 25%. 
 33 
Passiveness and institutional ownership 
Another possible concern could be that shareholder passiveness is proxying for 
institutional ownership. The correlation between institutional ownership and passiveness is 
0.25. Firms that have a low ownership per shareholder also have high institutional ownership. 
The positive relation between institutional ownership and passiveness could be the result of 
retail investors choosing to invest in stocks that they know institutional investors have 
incentives to monitor. 
When we sort companies in non-nested groups on institutional ownership and 
passiveness (Panel B of Table R1), we find that 30.90% (15.45%/50%) of companies with 
high institutional ownership still have low passiveness. An example of such a company is 
Bill Barrett Corp (cusip 06846N). As of the end of 2006, its institutional ownership was 
about 59.21%, which is similar to the 61.41% institutional ownership of Global Industries, 
Ltd (cusip 379336). The market capitalizations of these companies were comparable at about 
1.20bln and 1.52bln respectively. Both of these companies are in the natural resource 
industry (sic2=13). Yet Bill Barrett is in the bottom 25% of passiveness whereas Global 
Industries is among top 25%. 
 
Passiveness and corporate governance 
Our source of data on corporate governance is the Compustat-Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) merged database for non-financial firms from 1990 to 2004. The 
IRRC database is available only for 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. 
Following Rauh (2006), we fill in governance characteristics for unavailable years by taking 
the data from the most recent year for which it is available, but not more than 5 years back 
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for each firm. The Gompers et. al. (2003) governance index is used to measure the level of 
corporate governance.
2
 
We investigate whether shareholder passiveness is related to a firm’s other anti-
takeover defenses. The correlation between passiveness and G-index is 0.22: firms that have 
more anti-takeover defenses in place also tend to have a more passive shareholder base. This 
is also evident from the average passiveness across G-index groups (presented in Panel C of 
Table R1): average passiveness is steadily rising with G-index. This provides early evidence 
that shareholder passiveness is a substitute for other anti-takeover defenses. When we split 
companies into two groups by governance and into two groups by passiveness, we observe 
that there are 23.07% high G-index / low passiveness companies and 16.71% low G-index / 
high passiveness companies. If G-index fully explained passiveness these numbers should 
both be zero.
3
 
                                                 
2
 Occasionally, we consider whether a firm has a poison pill in place as a specific anti-takeover provision. In 
this case, we define an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a poison pill is present. 
3
 The examples of Aptar Group (cusip 038336) [consumer products, cosmetics] and Amsurg (cusip 03232P) 
[healthcare] illustrate that passiveness is a distinct characteristic from the G-index. Both of these firms have a  
well above median (=9 out 18) G-index of 11, suggesting management of these companies is entrenched; they 
are also among the top 25% of companies in terms of market cap. Aptar’s passiveness is -1.07 and Amsurg’s 
passiveness is 5.82, which puts them in the bottom and top quartile of passiveness respectively. 
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Table 1: descriptive statistics 
We present descriptive statistics on the variables used in our study. Derived Equity Stake, % ($) is the ratio of 
fraction of shares outstanding (its dollar value) owned by non-institutional shareholders divided by the number of 
non-institutional shareholders. Ownership per Institutional Investor is the percentage of company shares outstanding 
(its dollar value) owned by an institutional investor. Passiveness is the fraction of shares outstanding owned by the 
average non-institutional shareholder. All other variables are described in Appendix 1. All variables are winsorized 
at 1% and 99% of the distribution. The full sample covers the period between 1981 and 2007 and contains 83,611 
observations. The sample with available block and institutional ownership data covers the 1991 to 2006 time period 
and contains 39,557 observations. 
 
Full sample      
 Mean Median StDev Q1 Q3 
Derived Equity Stake, %  0.0250 0.0172 0.0237 0.0054 0.0390 
Derived Equity Stake, $ (ths) 138.1422 31.3590 716.9575 10.8151 93.7530 
Ownership per Inst Investor, %  0.8981 0.5763 1.4058 0.2619 1.1263 
Ownership per Inst Investor, $ (mln) 4.7044 1.9101 10.7203 0.4889 5.0986 
Passiveness 0.9568 0.7661 1.9279 -0.3540 2.1319 
Institutional Ownership (IO) 0.3058 0.2412 0.2667 0.0653 0.5026 
Log(market cap) 4.8121 4.7236 2.2552 3.2220 6.3293 
Log (B/M) -0.8422 -0.6513 1.1113 -1.3106 -0.1334 
ROA 0.0512 0.0372 0.4829 -0.0359 0.0690 
CAPEX 0.0604 0.0389 0.0715 0.0144 0.0781 
Cash 0.1472 0.0850 0.6434 0.0220 0.3059 
D/E 0.5704 0.2069 1.7008 0.0011 0.7171 
P/E 10.3518 10.8173 47.6996 -2.0818 19.7917 
Growth of Sales 0.0812 0.0837 0.4498 -0.0358 0.2246 
Past Year Return 0.0506 0.0911 0.6496 -0.2425 0.3789 
Volatility 0.0089 0.0040 0.0142 0.0015 0.0098 
Industry Concentration 0.0774 0.0482 0.0761 0.0325 0.0925 
Stock Liquidity 1.0676 0.6260 1.3518 0.2652 1.3135 
      
Sample with available block and insider ownership  
Passiveness 0.9028 0.7072 2.0271 -0.5053 2.1679 
Institutional Ownership 0.3450 0.3004 0.2766 0.0891 0.5672 
Block Ownership 0.3666 0.3318 0.2851 0.1242 0.5621 
Insider Ownership 0.1770 0.0834 0.2223 0.0104 0.2683 
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Table 2: Validation of US-based measure of passiveness with Swedish data 
We compare the dollar values of derived equity stakes for the US and Sweden and calculate measures of passiveness 
for Swedish firms using actual positions and derived equity stakes of Swedish non-institutional investors. Actual 
position value of non-institutional investors (non-institutional investors with direct ownership) is calculated as the 
number of shares x share price (expressed in US dollars); we consider equity positions held by non-institutional 
shareholders both directly and through a brokerage (directly only). We define dollar values of derived equity stakes 
as follows 
 
                                    
                             
                                           
 
 
                                                         
 
                             
                                                
 
 
Measures of Passiveness for Swedish data are defined as  
 
                                                                                              
                 
    
                                                               
  
 Mean Median 
US   
$ value of Derived Equity Stake, $ (ths) 138.142 31.359 
   
Sweden   
% positions held by non-institutional investors in direct ownership 0.389 0.378 
Actual Position value of non-institutional investors, $ (ths) 24.245 0.444 
Actual Position value of non-institutional investors (direct ownership), $ (ths) 28.650 0.400 
$ Value of Derived Equity Stake (direct ownership), ths($) 181.316 33.879 
Actual Passiveness (actual position of non-institutional investors) 1.719 1.516 
Passiveness (Derived Equity stake of (direct ownership)) 0.398 0.194 
   
Correlation(Actual Passiveness, Passiveness)  0.955 
   
R2 of regression of Actual Passiveness on Passiveness  0.865 
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Table 3: Passiveness and likelihood of receiving a bid 
We report the relation between shareholder passiveness and the likelihood of receiving an M&A bid. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the company 
receives an M&A bid over the following year and 0 otherwise. Passiveness is the fraction of shares outstanding owned by the average non-institutional 
shareholder. HighIO (HighBlock, HighInside) is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if Institutional Ownership is above 50% (Block Ownership is 
above 25%, Insider Ownership is above 10%) and 0 otherwise. F-tests for the difference between interactive coefficients are presented as well. All variables are 
described in Appendix 1.  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
 estimate t-stat ME estimate t-stat ME estimate t-stat ME estimate t-stat ME estimate t-stat ME 
Passiveness -0.031 (-3.95) -0.002 -0.029 (-3.05) -0.002          
  × HighIO       -0.021 (-1.52) -0.001       
  × (1-HighIO)       -0.037 (-4.22) -0.002       
  × HighBlock          -0.024 (-2.08) -0.001    
  × (1-HighBlock)          -0.036 (-3.75) -0.002    
  × HighIO or HighBlock or HighInside          -0.022 (-2.00) -0.001 
  × (1- HighIO or HighBlock or HighInside)        -0.067 (-6.30) -0.004 
Inst. Ownership 0.355 (6.30) 0.025 0.024 (0.34) 0.001 0.074 (1.20) 0.004 0.076 (1.22) 0.004 0.075 (1.23) 0.004 
Insider Ownership    0.076 (1.22) 0.004 0.025 (0.36) 0.001 0.016 (0.21) 0.001 0.022 (0.32) 0.001 
Block Ownership    0.391 (6.15) 0.022 0.365 (5.43) 0.021 0.381 (5.87) 0.022 0.348 (5.21) 0.020 
Log(size) -0.007 (-0.87) 0.000 -0.008 (-0.96) 0.000 -0.009 (-1.03) 0.000 -0.007 (-0.78) 0.000 -0.006 (-0.72) 0.000 
Log(B/M) 0.032 (3.35) 0.002 0.015 (1.05) 0.001 0.015 (1.08) 0.001 0.015 (1.08) 0.001 0.016 (1.16) 0.001 
ROA 0.001 (1.55) 0.000 0.011 (1.78) 0.001 0.011 (1.79) 0.001 0.011 (1.78) 0.001 0.011 (1.78) 0.001 
Capex -0.040 (-0.34) -0.003 0.351 (1.73) 0.020 0.356 (1.76) 0.020 0.346 (1.70) 0.020 0.346 (1.70) 0.020 
Cash -0.006 (-0.50) 0.000 0.004 (0.32) 0.000 0.004 (0.32) 0.000 0.004 (0.30) 0.000 0.003 (0.27) 0.000 
D/E 0.003 (0.60) 0.000 -0.009 (-1.00) -0.001 -0.009 (-1.00) -0.001 -0.009 (-1.00) -0.001 -0.009 (-1.02) -0.001 
P/E 0.000 (-2.05) 0.000 0.000 (-0.86) 0.000 0.000 (-0.84) 0.000 0.000 (-0.86) 0.000 0.000 (-0.82) 0.000 
Growth of Sales 0.033 (1.04) 0.002 0.029 (0.68) 0.002 0.029 (0.68) 0.002 0.028 (0.66) 0.002 0.027 (0.65) 0.002 
Past Year Return -0.019 (-1.30) -0.001 -0.010 (-0.62) -0.001 -0.009 (-0.54) -0.001 -0.011 (-0.66) -0.001 -0.011 (-0.66) -0.001 
Volatility 0.405 (0.49) 0.028 1.149 (1.06) 0.065 1.053 (0.94) 0.060 1.189 (1.10) 0.067 1.118 (1.01) 0.063 
Industry Concentr. -0.394 (-1.04) -0.028 -0.214 (-0.44) -0.012 -0.235 (-0.48) -0.013 -0.214 (-0.44) -0.012 -0.225 (-0.47) -0.013 
Stock Liquidity 0.049 (6.59) 0.003 0.030 (4.05) 0.002 0.031 (4.09) 0.002 0.029 (4.04) 0.002 0.030 (4.09) 0.002 
Industry FE  Sic2   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2  
Time FE   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Clustering   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2  
F-test       6.15 (0.02)  4.07 (0.05)  7.87 (0.01)  
Adjusted R2  0.0669   0.0797   0.0799   0.0798   0.0804  
N  83,611   39,557   39,557   39,557   39,557  
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Table 4: Passiveness and likelihood of deal completion 
We report the relation between shareholder passiveness and the likelihood of M&A deal completion. The dependent variables take the value of 1 if the takeover 
bid has been successful and 0 otherwise. Passiveness is the fraction of shares outstanding owned by the average non-institutional shareholder. HighIO 
(HighBlock, HighInside) is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if Institutional Ownership is above 50% (Block Ownership is above 25%, Insider 
Ownership is above 10%) and 0 otherwise. Poison Pill takes the value of 1 if a firm has a poison pill in place and 0 otherwise. All variables are described in 
Appendix 1.  
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
 estimate t-stat ME estimate t-stat ME estimate t-stat ME estimate t-stat ME estimate t-stat ME estimate t-stat ME 
Passiveness -0.082 (-4.38) -0.030 -0.063 (-3.25) -0.022             
  × HighIO       -0.060 (-2.03) -0.021          
  × (1-HighIO)       -0.065 (-2.68) -0.023          
  × HighBlock          -0.061 (-2.62) -0.022       
  × (1-HighBlock)          -0.065 (-2.98) -0.023       
  × HighIO or HighBlock or HighInside          -0.042 (-1.02) -0.015    
  × (1- HighIO or HighBlock or HighInside)       -0.068 (-3.40) -0.024    
  × poison pill                -0.090 (-0.70) -0.032 
  × no poison pill                 -0.063 (-3.27) -0.022 
Inst. Ownership 0.288 (2.95) 0.106 0.223 (1.41) 0.079 0.222 (1.38) 0.078 0.223 (1.42) 0.079 0.224 (1.42) 0.079 0.320 (2.66) 0.113 
Insider Ownership    0.196 (1.82) 0.069 0.197 (1.82) 0.070 0.193 (1.77) 0.068 0.200 (1.85) 0.071 0.223 (1.42) 0.079 
Block Ownership    0.321 (2.62) 0.113 0.313 (2.25) 0.111 0.318 (2.56) 0.112 0.340 (2.67) 0.120 0.197 (1.84) 0.069 
Log(size) 0.023 (1.21) 0.008 0.011 (0.47) 0.004 0.011 (0.48) 0.004 0.012 (0.51) 0.004 0.011 (0.45) 0.004 0.011 (0.48) 0.004 
Log(B/M) -0.022 (-0.90) -0.008 -0.021 (-0.75) -0.008 -0.022 (-0.75) -0.008 -0.021 (-0.75) -0.008 -0.022 (-0.76) -0.008 -0.021 (-0.75) -0.008 
ROA 0.136 (3.24) 0.050 0.153 (3.64) 0.054 0.154 (3.61) 0.054 0.153 (3.61) 0.054 0.154 (3.64) 0.054 0.153 (3.63) 0.054 
Capex -0.080 (-0.24) -0.030 -0.229 (-0.48) -0.081 -0.227 (-0.48) -0.080 -0.229 (-0.48) -0.081 -0.229 (-0.48) -0.081 -0.227 (-0.48) -0.080 
Cash 0.027 (1.07) 0.010 0.025 (0.97) 0.009 0.025 (0.96) 0.009 0.025 (0.95) 0.009 0.027 (1.03) 0.009 0.025 (0.97) 0.009 
D/E -0.003 (-0.25) -0.001 -0.010 (-0.74) -0.004 -0.010 (-0.74) -0.004 -0.010 (-0.74) -0.004 -0.010 (-0.73) -0.004 -0.010 (-0.74) -0.004 
P/E 0.001 (1.25) 0.000 0.001 (1.18) 0.000 0.001 (1.18) 0.000 0.001 (1.18) 0.000 0.001 (1.16) 0.000 0.001 (1.18) 0.000 
Growth of Sales -0.070 (-1.87) -0.026 -0.066 (-1.36) -0.023 -0.066 (-1.36) -0.023 -0.067 (-1.37) -0.024 -0.066 (-1.34) -0.023 -0.066 (-1.36) -0.023 
Past Year Return -0.020 (-0.48) -0.007 -0.025 (-0.79) -0.009 -0.025 (-0.78) -0.009 -0.025 (-0.80) -0.009 -0.025 (-0.77) -0.009 -0.025 (-0.79) -0.009 
Volatility -0.673 (-0.32) -0.247 -2.763 (-1.23) -0.975 -2.796 (-1.24) -0.987 -2.726 (-1.25) -0.962 -2.793 (-1.25) -0.985 -2.753 (-1.23) -0.971 
Industry Concentr 0.380 (0.80) 0.139 -0.637 (-0.69) -0.225 -0.647 (-0.70) -0.228 -0.640 (-0.69) -0.226 -0.616 (-0.66) -0.217 -0.629 (-0.68) -0.222 
Stock Liquidity -0.026 (-1.29) -0.010 -0.003 (-0.14) -0.001 -0.002 (-0.12) -0.001 -0.003 (-0.16) -0.001 -0.003 (-0.18) -0.001 -0.003 (-0.15) -0.001 
CashDeal 0.160 (2.76) 0.058 0.094 (1.53) 0.033 0.094 (1.54) 0.033 0.094 (1.53) 0.033 0.093 (1.53) 0.032 0.094 (1.54) 0.033 
Hostile -0.683 (-4.52) -0.267 -1.065 (-5.49) -0.406 -1.066 (-5.55) -0.406 -1.065 (-5.49) -0.405 -1.062 (-5.56) -0.405 -1.059 (-5.30) -0.403 
Merger 0.115 (0.48) 0.041 0.107 (0.43) 0.037 0.106 (0.42) 0.037 0.107 (0.43) 0.037 0.106 (0.43) 0.036 0.105 (0.42) 0.036 
Poison Pill -0.325 (-1.84) -0.125 -0.152 (-0.52) -0.055 -0.152 (-0.52) -0.056 -0.153 (-0.52) -0.056 -0.147 (-0.50) -0.053 -0.101 (-0.28) -0.036 
Industry FE  Sic2   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2  
Time FE   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Clustering   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2   Sic2  
Adjusted R2  0.0812   0.1004   0.1004   0.1004   0.1006   0.1004  
N  4,636   2,929   2,929   2,929   2,929   2,929  
 39 
Table 5: Passiveness and premium 
We report the relation between shareholder passiveness and M&A premium. The dependent variable is abnormal return 
on the target company stock over the (-62:+42) days event window around the M&A bid announcement. Passiveness is 
the fraction of shares outstanding owned by the average non-institutional shareholder. HighIO (HighBlock, HighInside) is 
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if Institutional Ownership is above 50% (Block Ownership is above 25%, 
Insider Ownership is above 10%) and 0 otherwise. Poison Pill takes the value of 1 if a firm has a poison pill in place and 
0 otherwise. F-tests for the difference between interactive coefficients are presented as well. All variables are described in 
Appendix 1.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat 
Passiveness 0.012 (2.23) 0.023 (3.77)         
  × HighIO     0.002 (0.42)       
  × (1-HighIO)     0.037 (4.32)       
  × HighBlock       0.008 (1.12)     
  × (1-HighBlock)       0.041 (4.31)     
  × HighIO or HighBlock or HighInside      0.011 (1.83)   
  × (1- HighIO or HighBlock or HighInside)     0.072 (5.35)   
  × poison pill           0.024 (0.55) 
  × no poison pill           0.023 (3.69) 
Inst. Ownership 0.272 (4.86) 0.237 (4.04) 0.289 (4.59) 0.254 (4.19) 0.159 (2.83) 0.157 (2.58) 
Insider Ownership   0.157 (2.58) 0.164 (2.73) 0.157 (2.64) 0.247 (5.35) 0.240 (5.11) 
Block Ownership   0.240 (5.09) 0.235 (4.92) 0.263 (5.66) 0.279 (4.48) 0.237 (4.05) 
Log(size) -0.031 (-3.14) -0.027 (-2.51) -0.024 (-2.33) -0.032 (-2.90) -0.028 (-2.69) -0.027 (-2.52) 
Log(B/M) 0.103 (6.32) 0.112 (5.47) 0.113 (5.70) 0.111 (5.43) 0.111 (5.59) 0.112 (5.47) 
ROA 0.092 (1.71) 0.070 (1.09) 0.067 (1.05) 0.072 (1.11) 0.072 (1.12) 0.070 (1.09) 
Capex 0.224 (1.41) 0.119 (0.80) 0.106 (0.71) 0.122 (0.81) 0.118 (0.76) 0.119 (0.80) 
Cash -0.042 (-2.96) -0.033 (-3.13) -0.032 (-3.32) -0.031 (-3.15) -0.029 (-3.19) -0.033 (-3.13) 
D/E -0.005 (-1.01) -0.006 (-0.88) -0.006 (-0.92) -0.005 (-0.83) -0.005 (-0.83) -0.006 (-0.88) 
P/E 0.000 (2.21) 0.001 (3.02) 0.000 (2.93) 0.001 (3.10) 0.000 (3.06) 0.001 (3.06) 
Growth of Sales -0.047 (-1.75) -0.062 (-1.94) -0.063 (-1.94) -0.058 (-1.85) -0.061 (-1.92) -0.062 (-1.94) 
Past Year Return 0.098 (5.23) 0.082 (3.97) 0.079 (3.91) 0.084 (4.07) 0.083 (4.08) 0.082 (3.98) 
Volatility 4.341 (4.32) 2.256 (1.85) 2.505 (2.04) 1.966 (1.63) 2.178 (1.77) 2.255 (1.85) 
Industry Concentr 0.015 (0.05) -0.262 (-0.97) -0.190 (-0.67) -0.236 (-0.86) -0.208 (-0.73) -0.263 (-0.97) 
Stock Liquidity -0.016 (-2.79) -0.004 (-0.76) -0.006 (-1.27) -0.002 (-0.37) -0.005 (-1.05) -0.004 (-0.76) 
CashDeal 0.097 (5.34) 0.062 (2.49) 0.060 (2.43) 0.059 (2.43) 0.059 (2.45) 0.062 (2.50) 
Hostile 0.065 (1.54) 0.071 (1.45) 0.079 (1.81) 0.068 (1.36) 0.078 (1.92) 0.071 (1.38) 
Merger -0.222 (-4.08) -0.242 (-4.87) -0.240 (-4.86) -0.248 (-4.66) -0.249 (-4.96) -0.242 (-4.91) 
Poison Pill 0.057 (1.63) 0.046 (0.61) 0.046 (0.65) 0.050 (0.66) 0.058 (0.83) 0.044 (0.34) 
industry FE Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Clustering  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  
F-test     11.51 (0.01) 9.17 (0.01) 15.22 (0.01) 0.03 (0.98) 
Adjusted R2 0.1451  0.18  0.1831  0.183  0.1864  0.18  
N 4,642  2,952  2,952  2,952  2,952  2,952  
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Table 6: Managing passiveness 
We relate change in passiveness between year t and t+1 to corporate events undertaken in year t. Split (Reverse Split, Rep, 
and SEO) is a dummy which equals 1 if a company undertook a stock split (reverse split, repurchase, or SEO) in year t 
and 0 otherwise. Stock split (size) is the number of new shares that have been created for every old share; zero if no stock 
split done. Reverse split (size) is the number of old shares which were aggregated into one new share minus one; zero if 
no reverse split done. SEO (size) is the percentage increase in the number of shares outstanding following the SEO 
divided by 100; zero if no SEO done. Repurchase (size) is the percentage decrease in the number of shares outstanding 
following a repurchase divided by 100, zero if no repurchase done. ΔInstitutional Ownership (∆Insider Ownership, 
∆Block Ownership) is a change in institutional (block, insider) ownership between year t and t+1. All other variables are 
measured as of the end of year t. All other variables are described in Appendix 1. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat 
Split (dummy) 0.021 (1.87)   0.060 (4.75)   
Split (size)   0.019 (1.95)   0.051 (3.42) 
Reverse Split (dummy) -0.059 (-1.50)   -0.125 (-3.67)   
Reverse Split (size)   -0.004 (-1.42)   -0.010 (-3.21) 
Repurchase (dummy) -0.037 (-3.92)   -0.045 (-5.85)   
Repurchase (size)   -0.246 (-3.94)   -0.179 (-3.29) 
SEO (dummy) 0.068 (3.65)   0.069 (4.30)   
SEO (size)   0.165 (1.99)   0.184 (2.64) 
Inst. Ownership -0.135 (-7.39) -0.138 (-7.77) 0.104 (5.86) 0.100 (5.70) 
Insider Ownership 0.039 (2.72) 0.040 (2.80) 0.071 (4.40) 0.074 (4.58) 
Block Ownership -0.005 (-0.36) -0.005 (-0.34) -0.005 (-0.58) -0.007 (-0.74) 
∆Inst. Ownership     2.188 (29.25) 2.184 (29.00) 
∆Insider Ownership     0.081 (3.25) 0.081 (3.22) 
∆Block Ownership     0.040 (2.40) 0.037 (2.22) 
Log(size) 0.020 (8.18) 0.020 (8.51) -0.001 (-0.37) -0.001 (-1.08) 
Log(B/M) -0.007 (-2.56) -0.007 (-2.68) -0.010 (-4.11) -0.011 (-4.28) 
ROA 0.001 (0.63) 0.000 (0.57) -0.001 (-1.03) -0.001 (-1.07) 
Capex 0.156 (2.78) 0.164 (2.84) 0.090 (1.45) 0.101 (1.58) 
Cash 0.002 (2.96) 0.003 (3.42) 0.003 (2.89) 0.003 (3.64) 
D/E 0.000 (0.27) 0.001 (0.32) 0.000 (0.16) 0.000 (0.19) 
P/E 0.000 (0.03) 0.000 (-0.04) 0.000 (-0.12) 0.000 (-0.16) 
Growth of Sales 0.017 (1.70) 0.018 (1.77) 0.020 (1.83) 0.022 (1.94) 
Past Year Return 0.034 (6.52) 0.034 (6.53) -0.004 (-0.69) -0.003 (-0.62) 
Volatility -1.026 (-4.67) -1.012 (-4.91) 0.475 (2.62) 0.472 (2.70) 
Industry Concentr. 0.044 (0.20) 0.045 (0.21) 0.152 (0.93) 0.154 (0.94) 
Stock Liquidity 0.007 (2.57) 0.0081 (2.76) 0.0078 (3.60) 0.009 (3.70) 
Industry FE Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Clustering  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  
Adjusted R2 0.023  0.0255  0.225  0.2266  
N 34,029  34,028  30,742  30,741  
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Table 7: The effect of anti-takeover law adoption in Delaware and shareholder passiveness 
We report the results of the effect of the introduction of anti-takeover legislation in Delaware on shareholder passiveness. 
The dependent variable is shareholder passiveness defined as the fraction of shares outstanding owned by the average 
non-institutional shareholder. Post1995 is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the year is 1996 or later and 0 
otherwise. Delaware is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm is incorporated in the state of Delaware and 
0 otherwise. All variables are described in Appendix 1.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat 
post1995 -0.351 (-10.78) -0.373 (-12.79) -0.299 (-7.84) -0.392 (-4.26) 
Delaware 0.176 (1.38) 0.049 (0.46) -0.022 (-0.20) -0.222 (-1.72) 
Post1995 × Delaware -0.221 (-2.87) -0.105 (-1.79) -0.213 (-2.79) -0.299 (-2.47) 
Poison Pill (pre 1995)     0.199 (6.99)   
Gindex       0.016 (2.42) 
Post1995 × Poison Pill     -0.109 (-2.56)   
Post 1995 × Gindex       0.003 (0.28) 
Delaware × Poison Pill     0.102 (2.51)   
Delaware × Gindex       0.026 (3.61) 
Post1995 × Delaware * Poison Pill  0.199 (3.29)   
Post1995 × Delaware * Gindex    0.021 (2.09) 
Inst. Ownership 4.198 (26.77) 0.964 (8.21) 0.883 (7.37) 0.896 (7.63) 
Insider Ownership   -0.008 (-11.32) -0.007 (-10.77) -0.007 (-10.62) 
Block Ownership   -0.006 (-12.80) -0.005 (-10.66) -0.006 (-11.14) 
Log(size) 0.267 (12.15) 0.319 (12.94) 0.288 (11.70) 0.280 (10.69) 
Log(B/M) 0.554 (23.75) 0.711 (79.35) 0.719 (79.57) 0.718 (76.64) 
ROA 0.245 (8.78) 0.361 (16.68) 0.362 (16.96) 0.363 (16.80) 
Capex 0.068 (7.67) 0.103 (9.16) 0.104 (9.56) 0.100 (8.66) 
Cash 0.000 (0.22) 0.000 (-0.16) 0.000 (-0.01) 0.000 (-0.14) 
D/E -1.005 (-7.97) -1.034 (-6.51) -1.053 (-6.77) -1.069 (-6.93) 
P/E 1.944 (8.33) 1.871 (7.79) 1.843 (7.76) 1.926 (8.00) 
Growth of Sales -0.217 (-5.35) -0.082 (-2.64) -0.085 (-2.77) -0.084 (-2.77) 
Past Year Return 71.986 (13.46) 45.014 (8.52) 45.132 (8.49) 46.533 (8.86) 
Volatility 0.662 (2.25) -0.162 (-0.54) -0.104 (-0.33) -0.096 (-0.31) 
Industry Concentr. -0.310 (-20.85) -0.206 (-16.61) -0.210 (-16.89) -0.202 (-16.82) 
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
State FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Clustering State+Time  State+Time  State+Time  State+Time  
Adjusted R2 0.5251  0.5974  0.6028  0.6023  
N 16,846  13,562  13,562  13,562  
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Table 8: Passiveness and retail trading activity 
We relate passiveness of shareholder base to retail trading activity. We consider three measures aimed at capturing the trading activity of retail investors: the ratio 
of the number of retail trades to the number of total trades executed by all investors (Specifications (1) and (2)), the ratio of the number of shares traded by retail 
investors to the number of total shares traded by all investors (Specifications (3) and (4)), and the ratio of the dollar value of shares traded by retail investors to 
the total dollar value of shares traded by all investors (Specifications (5) and (6)). We classify retail investors’ trades as those trades with less than 500 shares, 
using the convention of small trades adopted in Security and Exchange Commission’s Rule 11Ac1-5 (i.e., Dash-5). Using the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database 
produced by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), we first compute these ratios stock by stock on a daily basis, and then average these ratios with appropriate 
horizons. The data covers the 1992 to 2006 period. Panel A relates passiveness to the average daily retail trading activity over the subsequent year. Panel B 
reports on the relation between passiveness and average daily retail trading activity over (0:+2) window around earnings announcements. All variables are 
described in Appendix 1. 
 
Panel A: Passiveness and average daily retail trading activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat 
Passiveness -0.0073 (-6.77) -0.0074 (-7.93) -0.0048 (-8.51) -0.0050 (-9.03) -0.0053 (-8.63) -0.0054 (-8.94) 
Inst. Ownership 0.0871 (7.45) 0.0894 (7.48) 0.0511 (4.42) 0.0523 (4.40) 0.0466 (3.90) 0.0478 (3.87) 
Insider Ownership   0.0070 (0.91)   0.0189 (3.36)   0.0206 (3.29) 
Block Ownership   -0.0019 (-0.33)   0.0066 (1.63)   0.0086 (1.94) 
Log(size) 0.0331 (20.32) 0.0331 (21.43) 0.0066 (4.40) 0.0068 (4.65) 0.0055 (3.39) 0.0058 (3.67) 
Log(B/M) 0.0060 (5.15) 0.0060 (5.24) 0.0044 (4.73) 0.0043 (4.64) 0.0055 (5.46) 0.0053 (5.40) 
Past Year Return -0.0043 (-2.02) -0.0049 (-2.50) 0.0071 (5.03) 0.0061 (4.90) 0.0090 (4.89) 0.0078 (4.74) 
Volatility -1.1479 (-6.56) -1.1509 (-6.68) -0.5163 (-4.10) -0.5436 (-4.29) -0.5808 (-3.84) -0.6062 (-3.96) 
Stock Liquidity 0.0012 (1.37) 0.0013 (1.42) 0.0034 (3.86) 0.0034 (3.80) 0.0023 (2.35) 0.0024 (2.36) 
Industry FE Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  
Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Clustering Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  
Adjusted R2 0.7286  0.7277  0.5985  0.6051  0.5746  0.5806  
N 59,453  57,495  59,453  57,495  59,439  57,482  
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Panel B: Passiveness and retail trading activity around earnings announcements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat 
Passiveness -0.0066 (-6.17) -0.0061 (-6.81) -0.0067 (-8.03) -0.0060 (-7.46) -0.0072 (-7.55) -0.0063 (-6.64) 
Inst. Ownership 0.0736 (5.68) 0.0752 (5.64) 0.0405 (3.40) 0.0388 (3.13) 0.0328 (2.56) 0.0298 (2.21) 
Insider Ownership   0.0059 (0.77)   0.0167 (2.67)   0.0213 (2.21) 
Block Ownership   0.0045 (0.85)   0.0198 (4.52)   0.0269 (2.87) 
Log(size) 0.0287 (22.11) 0.0284 (21.93) -0.0006 (-0.51) -0.0006 (-0.49) -0.0057 (-4.08) -0.0055 (5.47) 
Log(B/M) 0.0047 (3.45) 0.0046 (3.40) 0.0048 (3.46) 0.0045 (3.22) 0.0075 (4.41) 0.0071 (-3.93) 
Past Year Return 0.0319 (24.30) 0.0327 (24.58) 0.0250 (21.04) 0.0246 (21.60) 0.0284 (22.38) 0.0278 (4.17) 
Volatility -2.0865 (-11.14) -2.1037 (-11.46) -1.5858 (-9.21) -1.6401 (-9.52) -1.9010 (-8.80) -1.9708 (22.73) 
Stock Liquidity 0.0005 (0.51) 0.0009 (0.89) -0.0003 (-0.23) 0.0004 (0.34) -0.0034 (-2.38) -0.0026 (-9.09) 
Industry FE Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  
Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Clustering Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  
Adjusted R2 0.6155  0.612  0.4574  0.4564  0.3656  0.3644  
N 207,694  202,677  207,694  202,677  205,519  200,544  
 
 44 
Table 9: Passiveness and Tobin’s Q 
We relate passiveness to a firm’s Tobin’s Q at the end of the subsequent year. All variables are described in Appendix 1. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat 
Passiveness -0.060 (-5.36) -0.047 (-3.38)       
  ×HighIO     -0.019 (-1.20)     
  × (1-HIghIO)     -0.071 (-4.44)     
  × HighBlock       -0.012 (-1.01)   
  × (1-HighBlock)       -0.103 (-4.77)   
  × HighIO or HighBlock or HighInside      -0.018 (-1.37) 
  × (1- HighIO or HighBlock or HighInside)     -0.182 (-5.94) 
Inst. Ownership -1.284 (-6.16) -1.252 (-5.66) -1.358 (-6.67) -1.358 (-6.08) -1.485 (-6.88) 
Insider Ownership   0.129 (1.67) 0.122 (1.61) 0.127 (1.63) 0.102 (1.40) 
Block Ownership   -0.551 (-6.23) -0.545 (-6.17) -0.631 (-7.18) -0.573 (-6.76) 
Log(size) 0.207 (6.98) 0.192 (5.68) 0.192 (5.76) 0.208 (6.04) 0.207 (6.18) 
ROA -0.019 (-2.61) -0.017 (-2.93) -0.017 (-2.92) -0.017 (-2.91) -0.017 (-2.92) 
Capex 2.621 (6.19) 2.960 (5.91) 2.974 (5.96) 2.913 (5.85) 2.936 (5.90) 
Cash 0.223 (5.19) 0.169 (5.97) 0.169 (6.06) 0.167 (6.11) 0.168 (6.30) 
D/E -0.092 (-6.87) -0.086 (-5.62) -0.086 (-5.59) -0.085 (-5.56) -0.085 (-5.59) 
P/E 0.000 (-0.45) 0.000 (-0.53) 0.000 (-0.51) 0.000 (-0.52) 0.000 (-0.48) 
Growth of Sales 0.162 (2.49) 0.113 (1.65) 0.113 (1.66) 0.105 (1.62) 0.106 (1.64) 
Past Year Return 0.307 (4.59) 0.317 (4.18) 0.321 (4.25) 0.310 (4.11) 0.314 (4.15) 
Volatility -1.804 (-1.76) -5.583 (-3.82) -5.893 (-4.06) -5.327 (-3.61) -5.788 (-4.03) 
Industry Concentr -0.469 (-1.34) -0.183 (-0.29) -0.222 (-0.34) -0.160 (-0.25) -0.197 (-0.31) 
Stock Liquidity 0.138 (15.62) 0.117 (11.79) 0.120 (11.83) 0.114 (11.38) 0.120 (12.11) 
industry FE Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Clustering  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  Sic2  
Adjusted R2 0.2099  0.2032  0.2037  0.2052  0.2068  
N 73,250  35,881  35,881  35,881  35,881  
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Table R1: Inside ownership, institutional ownership, corporate governance, and 
passiveness 
We present the descriptive statistics of the relationship between insider ownership, institutional ownership, 
corporate governance, and shareholder passiveness. Each year companies are split into two groups by insider 
ownership/institutional ownership/corporate governance and two groups by shareholder passiveness. We report 
the percentage of firms falling into each of the four resulting groups. In Panel C we also report the average 
shareholder passiveness for different levels of the G governance index. All variables are described in Appendix 
1. 
 
Panel A: passiveness and insider ownership 
 
  insider ownership  
  low High  
Passiveness low 19.10% 30.90%  
 high 30.90% 19.10%  
     
Panel B: passiveness and institutional ownership 
  institutional ownership  
  low High  
Passiveness low 34.55% 15.45%  
 high 15.45% 34.55%  
 
Panel C: passiveness and G-index 
 G-index 
 1-5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12-18 
Passiveness 1.8371 2.0921 2.1928 2.4199 2.6072 2.8090 2.9947 3.1251 
 
  G-index 
  low High 
Passiveness low 33.29% 23.07% 
 high 16.71% 26.93% 
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Table R2: Passiveness by industry 
We report the bottom 10 and top 10 SIC2-industries by average shareholder passiveness. All variables are described in Appendix 1. 
Panel A: Bottom 10 industries by average passiveness 
SIC2 bottom 10 industries by average passiveness Average passiveness 
83 social services -0.8646 
31 leather and leather products 0.2320 
99 nonclassifiable establishments 0.2374 
22 textile mill products 0.2417 
82 educational services 0.3693 
73 business services 0.5210 
17 construction special trade 0.5337 
87 engineering, accounting and related services 0.5369 
38 measuring, analyzing and controlling instruments 0.5387 
28 chemicals and allied products 0.5737 
 
Panel B: Top 10 industries by average passiveness 
SIC2 top 10 industries by average passiveness Average Passiveness 
21 tobacco products 3.3358 
60 depository institutions 3.2058 
40 railroad transportation 3.1818 
49 electric, gas and sanitary services 3.1440 
53 general merchandise stores 3.1159 
29 petroleum refining and related industries 2.9090 
45 transportation by air 2.6425 
26 paper and allied products 2.5767 
75 automotive repairs, services, and parking 2.5391 
54 food stores 2.3437 
 
 
